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Abstract.  This article attempts to identify the utility of biometric technology for variants of aviation 
security. 
 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks within the United States (US), some US executive 
and legislative branch officials, leaders of the aviation industry, and security and intelligence analysts 
have vociferously pushed biometric technology as a significant part of an upgraded aviation security 
system.  Yet this technology might contribute to aviation security significantly less than its proponents 
assert. 
 
In the aviation security context, biometric technology usually denotes mechanical, computerized, and 
electrical devices developed to measure physical characteristics of people.  The most common 
characteristics include structural aspects of the face, fingerprints, and most aspects of the iris.  The gross 
utility of biometric technology is based on assumptions that (1) each person has a unique physical 
signature concerning the face, fingerprints, or iris; (2) the signature can be detected to some 
"acceptable" level of accuracy; and (3) detection of the signature has significant security implications. 
 
Unique Physical Signature.  It is through inductive reasoning that the assumption of a unique physical 
signature is commonly made.  That is, based on a conclusion stemming from observation that so many 
individuals have the same property--e.g., a unique physical signature--a generalization is made that all 
members of a class from which the individual cases were taken have the same property.  This is the case 
even if most members of that class have not been observed to elucidate that property. 
 
"Acceptable" Level of Accuracy.  All people may have a unique physical signature, but the resolution of 
relevant technology is not fine enough to discern the signature.  The magnitude of false positive and 
false negative rates also will be crucial in determining what is acceptable along with political and other 
public policy constraints. 
 
Significant Security Implication.  Even if uniqueness and accuracy are reached at the 100% level, 
proponents of biometric technology must answer the "so what?" question.  It may be easiest to do this 
by positing how the technology can help with populations of "good guys" and "bad guys." 
 
"Good guys" may include frequent flyers and so-called trusted flyers.  The idea is that (1) people who 
have flown often, often at higher price, and/or without negative consequences for aviation security 
and/or (2) people who voluntarily submit to extensive background investigations--with said 
investigations coming back "clean"--are biometrically identified.  Their biometric identities are placed in 
a database and these people are then biometrically scanned and compared with their "stored" 
biometric identities each time they are set to fly. 
 
The premise is that a match of present scanning and database identities suggests that the individual is 
not a significant risk to aviation security.  However, good people can go bad and may already have been 
bad at the time of the initial database identification--much as seemingly good people commit espionage, 
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sabotage, murder, and mayhem.  In fact, acts of espionage and the like are more frequent than acts of 
aviation terrorism and often less catastrophic.  All the match seems likely to accomplish is facilitate the 
post-catastrophe investigation.  The same would be the case for biometrics applied to "in-house" airport 
and airline employees in the context of access to restricted areas. 
 
"Bad guys" are the aviation terrorists and others intent on catastrophic aviation security violation--some 
of whom may be perceived as "good guys" as described above.  The attempt to match database and 
present scan identities is rendered difficult by shortfalls in human and technical intelligence--and 
prudent selection of terrorist perpetrators by terrorist entities--wherein many "bad guys" will not have 
been included in the data base.  Here, of course, an attempt at a match is not possible. 
 
On a continuum of aviation security threat, biometrics are likely to be least useful against a 
sophisticated terrorist entity and most useful against someone with a long public history of violent 
behavior. 
 
The funding of biometric technological products will be significantly helpful to the economic security of 
the companies receiving the funding.  Given that economic security is one part of national security, this 
conclusion is not necessarily detrimental to the US.  However, as with many aviation security initiatives 
put in place or likely to be since September 11, 2001, the terrorism-related utility of biometric pales 
before the three necessities of upgrading intelligence capabilities, strengthening and employing 
counterterrorist assets, and intensifying antiterrorism initiatives through the psychological lens of all 
foreign policy tools.  (See AcSys Biometrics.  http://www.acsysbiometrics.com; Dishman, C.  (2001). 
Terrorism, crime and transformation. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24, 43-58; International Biometric 
Group.  http://www.biometricgroup; Mahmood, C.K.  (2001). Terrorism, myth, and the power of 
ethnographic praxis. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 30, 520-545; UnisysBioware.  
http://www.unisys.com.) (Keywords: Aviation Security, Biometrics.) 
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